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THE PROPOSED "SCIENCE COURT" 
James A. Martin* 
Serious attention has been paid in the past two years to the pro-
posal to establish a "science court" to assist public policymakers on 
important issues involving scientific or technological matters. 1 The 
common thread among the many models suggested by proponents 
of the idea is a mechanism whereby the factual, scientific com-
ponents of important public questions can be separated from policy 
considerations and evaluated by judges who are both scientifically 
competent and neutral. The choice of the phrase "science court" 
is probably· unfortunate insofar as it implies many things that we 
traditionally associate with courts: strict rules of evidence, finality 
of judgments, and the like. Yet the phrase does accurately reflect 
a central belief of the science court's proponents-that the adver-
sarial process, which is central to the trial process in the common-
law system, holds promise for supplying provisional answers to scien-
tific questions that must be answered before policy may be set. 
Even at the outset, however, it should be noted that the contribution 
of a science court would not be-and could not be-final answers 
to scientific questions, but rather would be a conclusion reached by 
a reliable procedure that we have done all we can reasonably do for 
the present to produce the best possible provisional answer for a 
policy question that needs immediate action. 
This article discusses the desirability of establishing some kind 
of science court. Section I examines arguments in favor of the crea-
tion of a science court. Section II compares the truth-seeking devices 
of the scientific method and the legal system in order to assess their 
merits in assisting the public policymakers faced with issues involving 
scientific matters. Section III discusses the various models that have 
been proposed for a science court. Section IV concentrates on the 
model proposed by Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz, taking it as the preferred 
model, and defends it against some criticism while suggesting various 
refinements. Section V examines the potential dangers of such an 
adjudicatory device to see whether or not they can be overcome. 
* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.S. 1965, University of Illi-
nois; M.S. (mathematics) 1966, J.D. 1969, The University of Michigan. 
1. See Boffey, Experiment Planned To Test Feasibility of a "Science Court," 193 
ScJENCE 129 (1976). 
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Section VI supplies an imagined case history of a case submitted to 
a science court in order to illustrate the concepts discussed in the 
article. Finally, section VII examines the weaknesses of the pro-
posal and ponders the underlying question, is it worth it? 
For purposes of more critical evaluation by the reader, I will state 
at the outset that in studying the matter my doubts about the science 
court proposal have shifted from concern over procedural difficulties, 
which I believe are soluble, and potential abuses, which I think can 
be avoided, to the final question posed above: whether the effort 
is justified by the results. 
I. REASONS FOR CREATING A SCIENCE COURT 
Four main reasons have been advanced for devising some 
means, such as the science court, for answering scientific2 questions 
involved in public policy issues. The first and most obvious is the 
need for accurate information to serve as a basis for deciding basic 
policy questions. Will freon damage the upper atmosphere and 
thereby increase the incidence of skin cancer, or will it lower the 
oxygen level of the atmosphere? Is saccharin a dangerous food addi-
tive? How dangerous are breeder reactors? Few of us, in analyzing 
such issues, place much confidence in the claims of interested parties 
or their representatives, even if those representatives happen to be 
scientists. In fact, many recent scientific policy issues involve com-
peting claims of scientists, which leaves nonscientific policymakers 
the task of choosing among scientific claims. 
A second expressed goal for an institution for settling scientific 
issues is to limit the power exercised by scientists. The idea here 
is that, absent a mechanism to deal separately with the scientific is-
sues, policymakers are inclined to ask the scientists for policy recom-
mendations, not simply for scientific facts. Thus the social views of 
scientists, the soundness of which may not be particularly related to 
their scientific learning, may be imposed under the guise of scientific 
expertise. That tendency is all the less acceptable when it is not 
made clear that policy questions are in fact being passed upon by 
such experts. For example, a scientist appearing at a 'congressional 
hearing might be asked whether or not breeder reactors present 
"acceptable risks." The scientist's expertise mayi enable him or 
her to estimate risks, and perhaps constant thought about the 
problem has resulted in a more refined appreciation for the policies 
2. "Scientific" is used here to exclude the so-called "soft sciences" because of the 
difficulty in reaching objective answers in such fields. 
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involved, but clearly the favorable presumption that ought to attach 
to the scientist's informed evaluations of the scientific issues should 
not extend to the scientist's opinion as to whether a predicted risk 
is acceptable. The problem is aggravated when all, or at least most, 
of the scientists in a particular field owe their livelihood (or political 
allegiance) to one policy or another. Thus a researcher in hydrogen 
fusion may have nonscientific as well as scientific reasons for favor-
ing massive funding for research in that area, while advocates of or-
ganic gardening may reflect more than scientific interests in their 
opinions on the correct policy concerning fertilizers or food additives. 
A third stated reason for a science court is to eliminate the op-
portunity for policymakers to hide policy decisions behind scientific 
conclusions. For example, whatever might be the merits of continu-
ing the present penalties for the use of marijuana, legislators ought 
not to be able to justify their position on this issue by pointing to the 
now-discredited notion that marijuana is physically addictive. 
Finally, some supporters of the science court idea have argued 
that discredited claims should be identified, especially when they 
arise in the course of public debate. In other words, when propa-
ganda on an issue is abundant, those trying to collect data may be 
confounded by claims that are made in one place (such as one publi-
cation) and refuted only in another. The refutation may be conclu-
sive, but it does not enlighten public opinion unless the two 
views are compared and evaluated. As one commentator put it, "A 
major problem is that sometimes concerned industries hire public re-
lations firms who bombard newspaper science writers and others with 
distracting side issues, distortions, and half-truths. By a mass action 
effect, these slanted statements dominate the public's perception of 
the situation and keep some subjects 'controversial' long after scien-
tific conclusions about them have been reached."3 In a sense this 
motivation for a science court differs only in degree from the first 
listed above, since it focuses on the ability of an institution like a 
science court to dispose of "easy" issues, even if it will not always 
be successful with the difficult ones. 
An example of the kind of issue that proponents of the science 
court would put to it is one mentioned above, the effect of 
chlorofluorocarbons on the ionosphere--the so-called freon issue. 
Several years ago it was suggested that freon destroys ozone in the 
upper atmosphere, and that sufficient amounts of freon are being 
3. Harold S. Johnston, letter to editor, 191 ScIENCE 1125 (1976) (footnote omit-
ted). 
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released into the atmosphere from such things as aerosol sprays and 
refrigeration units to cause significant reduction in the amount of 
ozone in the upper atmosphere. Such a depletion would increase 
the amount of ultraviolet light reaching the earth's surface and thus 
probably increase the incidence of human skin cancer. It might also 
adversely affect various algae that supply a major part of the earth's 
free oxygen. 
The freon case is a good example of the kind of issue science 
court proponents would like to see submitted to the court because, 
almost immediately after the initial suggestion of harm to the atmo-
sphere from freon, industry representatives came forward with claims 
that the danger was not nearly so great as suggested. The fact that 
the original researchers have studied the matter further and, with 
others, have modified some of the earlier predictions has not 
eliminated the disagreement. Some limitations on the use of freon 
are being implemented at the federal level, and there are currently 
proposals in some state legislatures to ban the use of the chemical. 
The freon controversy also serves to illustrate the difficult 
problems that often confront policymakers who must determine both 
scientific facts and public policy. If the worst fears of the original 
researchers are realized, there could be thousands of extra cases of 
skin cancer per year, and the oxygen level of the atmosphere could 
drop. Juxtaposed against these highly speculative dangers (that will 
occur only if a long chain of events takes place as tentatively pre-
dicted) is the loss of a useful product, harm to an industry, and the 
loss of many of the jobs that it provides.4 
Opposition to the idea of a science court stems mainly from two 
concerns: that the attempt to isolate scientific issues from political 
issues will prove to be impossible, and that by making pronounce-
ments on controversial scientific matters the science court would 
stifle further consideration, debate, and research on the matter. Ex-
pressions of the degree of the danger posed by such a court have 
ranged from statements of mild distrust to reminders of the medieval 
Church's attempt to stifle Galileo. These and other problems will 
be considered below. 
4. The difficulty is not resolved by invoking the principle that one should err on 
the side of caution when lives may be lost, since that principle merely amounts to 
advice to give greater weight to factors on one side of the question than to those 
on the other, and the problem is that one cannot give greater weight to any given 
factors until there is some idea of how much weight, if any, they deserve in the first 
place. For example, one does not stay at home all day every day just because of 
the •possibility that one could get run over crossing the street, and yet one should 
err on the side of the protection of life. 
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In order to understand why scientists and policymakers might be 
tempted to turn to the legal model represented by a science court, 
rather than relying on the traditional "scientific method," for the 
resolution of controversial scientific issues, and to understand why 
others might oppose it, it is appropriate to start with a comparison 
of the legal method and the scientific method. 
II. A COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL AND 
SCIENTIFIC METHODS 
Both the sciences and the law have developed procedures for the 
determination of truth. The first step in the scientific method is the 
formulation of a hypothesis, or tentative theory. 6 The second step 
is to make predictions suggested by the theory (and, to be useful, 
not also suggested by whatever competing theories there may be on 
the subject). Thus Newton could predict, on the basis of his theory, 
that the planets would follow certain paths. Finally, observations are 
made to see whether they comport with predictions based on the 
theory. If they do, the theory is tentatively confirmed (but only ten-
tatively-after all, other theories might also comport with the particu-
lar observations made); if they do not, the theory is disproved. 0 
Contrast the legal truth-finding method. First, the nature of the 
particular truth in question is different-the court looks for particular 
facts to which the law is to be applied, while the scientific method 
seeks to establish "laws" or general truths. Second, the legal method 
assigns specific roles to different persons in the trial process. It re-
quires at least two advocates, a referee, and a finder of fact. In 
particular, this process places great emphasis upon the role of 
adversaries in the truth-finding function. The scientific method, by 
contrast, assigns no formal role to any person and requires no division 
of labor among its participants (though, to increase reliability, the 
process of testing a theory by comparing its predictions to observa-
tions is undertaken not only by the original proponent of the theory 
but by others as well). 
5. Observations may suggest a theory, as Newton's apple is said to have jarred 
him into conceiving his universal law of gravitation, but the connection between such 
initial observations and the hypothesis is a psychological, not a deductive or logical, 
link. The fact that an apple is attracted to the earth does not logically imply that 
the moon is similarly attracted to the earth, but the falling apple may have suggested 
that hypothesis to Newton. 
6. In practice, even though a theory is formally disproved, it may require only 
a small amount of tinkering to bring it into line with the disproving observation. 
But until the tinkering is accomplished, the theory is disproved, and ad hoc tinkering 
is generally not useful. Any theory that says "X will happen" can avoid being dis-
proved when X doesn't happen by adding the ad hoc qualifier, "except this time." 
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Third, the legal method sometimes consciously sacrifices its 
truth-seeking goal to other values, such as efficiency (as seen from 
some procedural rules) and competing social values (as seen in evi-
dentiary privileges, for example), while the scientific method makes 
no such institutionalized concessions to competing values. Fourth, 
the legal method has a means of resolving factual disputes in the 
presence of uncertainty or ignorance: the party having the burden 
of proof loses when it fails to persuade the trier of fact. In contrast, 
the scientific method simply defers decisions for which information 
is inadequate. Another way of expressing this distinction is to say 
that the legal method produces final adjudications of fact, while the 
scientific method is often incapable of doing so. AB noted above, 
the scientific method simply withholds judgment when data are insuf-
ficient, but the legal system invokes presumptions. Moreover, since 
the nature of the testing under the scientific method is such that 
theories may be disproved, but cannot be finally proved, there is a 
second impediment to finality under the factfinding process. And, 
of course, even scientific theories which are well established have 
occasionally been later rejected, while the facts in Shelly's Case are 
unlikely to be redetermined. 
For the purposes of the policymakers, the degree of finality 
accorded by the legal and scientific methods may be the most critical 
distinction between the two processes. The acquisition of scientific 
knowledge operates under no deadlines per se, while the final deter-
mination of facts ( and attendant legal rights) is of utmost impor-
tance to the legal process. The legal system, in fact, has responded 
not only by limiting the time for the initial determination of facts, 
but also by the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which 
preserve even erroneous determinations of fact for the sake of 
finality. 
The need for finality in the advice given to policymakers on 
scientific issues lies somewhere between the extremes of the legal 
and scientific methods. The total absence of finality in the scientific 
method-the ability simply to wait for a conclusion-is clearly inap-
propriate for advising policymakers on scientific issues. Some deci-
sions need to be made quickly. For example, given limited money 
and future energy needs, massive funding of energy research may 
require choices among (to name a few) fusion power, solar power, 
and coal gasification. On the other hand, the strict-finality approach 
of the legal system is also clearly inappropriate to policy decision-
making. If some scientific advisory group sought out by Congress 
or the President were to conclude that fusion power held little 
1064 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1058 
promise of practicality before the year 2000, it would be foolish 
to persist blindly in a policy based upon that advice if a subsequent, 
unexpected scientific breakthrough in fusion power were to occur. 
What seems to be needed is a hybrid of the two methods that 
combines the virtues of the legal method in producing final answers 
to problems with the reluctance of the scientific method to make any 
"final" answers too final. In particular, the use of adversaries has 
great promise in bringing issues quickly to a head. Nothing in the 
scientific method guarantees that hypotheses will be tested or when 
they will be tested, while the adversary process usually guarantees 
that all points of an opposing position will be raised and decided 
within the time limits of the litigation. Moreover, the adversary pro-
cess, by using the bias of interested parties to reveal the errors in their 
opponents' positions, tends to correct a problem that is dealt with far 
more haphazardly by the scientific method. 
On the other hand, presumptions and burdens of proof should 
play no part in the deliberations of any advisers to policymakers. 
Such devices represent policy decisions in the legal system that, in 
the absence of all the necessary information, cases should be resolved 
in a certain way (e.g., against the party bearing the burden of proof). 
The whole point of the science court proposal is to separate scientific 
from policy issues, allocating the scientific questions to experts on 
science and the policy questions to those public representatives 
charged with making informed policy. Similarly, the science court 
must not adopt the rigidity of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
found in the legal model, although some kind of finality must be 
maintained so that policy decisions can in fact be made. 
ill. VARIOUS APPROACHES 
A. The Kantrowitz Model 
Several models, each varying in format and degree of specificity, 
have been proposed for a "science court." The person chiefly re-
sponsible for current interest in the subject is Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz, 
Chairman of Avco Everett Research Laboratory. He has proposed7 
a science court with three major characteristics. First, the science 
court would be a body to pass on scientific aspects of public policy 
questions presented to it, carefully avoiding "political and moral" 
issues which may be closely connected with the scientific issues. Sec-
ond, the science court should have both advocates and judges. The 
advocates should be drawn from among scientists working in the 
7. Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democraticall>1, 1975 AMERICAN ScI-
ENTIST 505. 
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field in which the controversy arises, since they are the most knowl-
edgeable about the subject in question and best able to criticize op-
posing viewpoints. Science court judges, on the other hand, should 
be people who "understand the rules of scientific evidence, have no 
intellectual or other commitments regarding matters before them, 
and possess the mature judgment needed to weigh the evidence pre-
sented. "8 They should not be from the specific area in which the 
controversy arises, since bias or the appearance of bias would be hard 
to avoid under such circumstances, but presumably they should be 
from allied fields to assure that they are capable of understanding 
the arguments presented. Judges in the Kantrowitz model would 
be chosen from a panel by the advocates for each side, with a "right 
to challenge judges for evidence of prejudice."9 Third, findings 
should be published, subject to national security restrictions. Publi-
cation would extend the benefit of the factfinding process to the en-
tire scientific and political community and perhaps lend prestige to 
the position of science court judge, thus helping to attract qualified 
personnel. Presumably the publication of conclusions would also 
serve a function similar to that of the publication of legal opinions, 
which provide an additional incentive toward accuracy and create the 
opportunity for criticism of the conclusions by knowledgeable per-
sons.10 
B. Some Competing Models 
Unstated by Kantrowitz, but more or less implied in his scheme, 
is the notion that the science court would be in some way a per-
manent institution. Although panels would change, the framework 
would remain available, and presumably a body of procedural rules, 
customs, and the like would arise. None of that is necessary, how-
ever, to his central idea, and others have proposed a more evanescent 
model in which no ongoing institutional structure exists; rather, 
panels simply would be convened when needed and dissolved after 
their final report.11 The virtues of a permanent institution include 
the ability to preserve the benefits of experience (as judges, for 
8. Id. at 507. 
9. Id. 
10. Encouraging criticism reduces presumptive finality, of course, but that should 
not really be a problem. By way of analogy, criticism of United States Supreme 
Court opinions in the law reviews has rarely been perceived as harmful because it 
detracts from the finality of a particular holding. 
11. See, e.g., Science Court: High Officials Back Test of Controversial Concept, 
194 SclENCE 167 (1976). 
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example, are supposed to improve with experience), while the vir-
tues of the "one-shot" model include the avoidance of the calcifica-
tion that sometimes accompanies institutionalization. 
A more dramatically different suggestion has been made in a 
thoughtful article by Barry Casper of the Department of Physics of 
Carleton College. 12 Casper argues that the advantages of the science 
court idea flow mainly from the adversary part of the process and 
that the chief difficulty with current legal decisionmaking processes 
is that the two sides very often simply argue past each other, 
emphasizing different matters and failing to answer each other's 
arguments in a structured way. He also claims that in most cases 
the scientific issues are not really in dispute, but that, because of 
the tendency just noted, the different sides simply emphasize or ig-
nore different issues. He concludes from these observations that, 
while the common-law judge's role is unnecessary for a science court, 
the adversaries' functions (chiefly in assuring by cross-examination 
that all issues will in fact be considered) are necessary for the proper 
resolution of scientific questions. Casper would have the adversaries 
face each other before congressional committees and in debates on 
public television. Members of Congress and television viewers could 
then make up their own minds as to the scientific and policy ques-
tions at hand. Since the Casper model assumes that most diputes 
arise because the adversaries emphasize different facts, rather than 
because the parties disagree over scientific issues, and that the op-
portunity to cross-examine will expose the relevance of facts ignored 
by the various sides to the dispute, it follows that under his model 
scientific expertise will not be needed to resolve any of the scientific 
issues. 
C. Current Models 
We do, of course, "muddle through" at present by using various 
means of attempting to resolve scientific facts underlying other dis-
putes. One of them is the method used by congressional committees 
and subcommittees: the use of expert witnesses, usually making pre-
pared statements, who are subject to some examination by the 
members and staff of the committees. The difficulty with this ap-
proach, as Casper points out, is that the adversaries themselves do 
not have the opportunity for cross-examination, and the committee 
members, who are seeking to alleviate their ignorance on the topic 
of the testimony, do not have the necessary expertise to cross-
12. Casper, Technology Policy and Democracy, 194 ScIENcE 29 (1976). 
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examine. Furthermore, the Executive, at least under the Ford 
Administration, has shown a great reluctance to subject administra-
tion experts to cross-examination by opposing experts in front of a 
committee of Congress.13 As a political matter, that reluctance is 
understandable, since the confrontation might weaken the Executive 
vis-a-vis the Congress. 
A second method we currently use to ascertain scientific facts 
is the presentation of expert testimony in judicial trials. This method 
avoids the chief problem with the congressional hearing model-lack 
of cross-examination-which is the reason that Kantrowitz chose this 
process as the starting point for his suggestion. At present, of 
course, the method is not used for the "big issues," but rather is 
limited to individual judicial disputes. 
Another method that is currently enjoying some popularity is the 
use of advisory panels composed of both scientists and laymen. The 
idea here is that the presence of the scientists insures scientific objec-
tivity in the decisionmaking process, while the presence of the lay-
men (who may or may not form the majority) prevents scientific 
elitism, that is, resolution of the social issues as well as the scientific 
issues by scientists. The lay members are seen also as providing 
the wisdom of the community on the social policy questions. 
The frequently used mixed-advisory panel is probably the most 
attractive competitor to the idea of the science court, but it has sig-
nificant disadvantages not shared by the various science court pro-
posals. First, even if the lay votes outnumber the scientists' votes 
on an advisory panel, the scientists are nonetheless given votes on 
the policy matters involved almost unavoidably well out of proportion 
to their percentage of the population. Thus, the advisory panel 
merely diminishes one of the evils that is apparently eliminated by 
the science court proposal. 
Second, a serious problem with giving scientists membership on 
a deliberating panel would be that the nonexpert members might 
give undue weight to the scientists' policy opinions. The members 
of the panel would not be equal-the lay members would be 
equipped with common sense and a moral consciousness, while the 
scientific members would presumably have both those qualities plus 
a critical expertise in factual matters. Under such circumstances it 
is possible for the panel to avoid giving undue weight to the policy 
opinions of the scientists, but it is sufficiently uncertain to make the 
mixed panel's independence questionable. 
13. Id. at 34-35. 
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Third, and probably most serious, if one compares the advisory 
panel to the science court proposal and notes that both ideas involve 
the assistance of scientists in reaching policy decisions, it is clear 
that the chief difference between the two concepts is that the scien-
tists participate in the policy deliberations in the advisory-panel 
model but not in the science court model. What may be said of 
actual participation by scientists in deliberations? A comparison to 
the use of expert testimony in front of juries is useful. There, of 
course, the experts do not participate in decisionmaking. Were 
they to do so, some of the function of the jury would be usurped, 
but the jury would have the benefit of accurate scientific information 
(or other kinds of information provided by the experts) at every 
stage of its deliberations, and the jury would have a check against 
misunderstanding of the expert testimony it has heard. Yet what 
if the experts disagreed in the jury room? The lay members would 
have to fill the roles of the science court judges in sorting out these 
disagreements before being able to use the scientific information 
from the experts. Moreover, the potential bias of the experts, which 
is put to affirmative use in the science court model, would be under 
no careful control in the jury room. 
Probably the most telling objection to the advisory panel, 
however, is not the way in which it arrives at scientific conclusions 
but rather is the fact that it does arrive at policy decisions or recom-
mendations. Use of the advisory panel means obtaining advice from 
those who have not been elected or appointed to make policy. Thus, 
as a matter of necessity, the panel's advice cannot be binding, but 
rather can be only persuasive. It is still necessary to deliver both 
scientific advice and policy advice to the final policymakers. If, as 
the science court backers claim, the scientific issues can be separated 
from the policy issues, there is no need to mix the two, nor is there 
any need to filter the scientific component of the advice through the 
votes of nonscientists. If the policy input that an advisory panel 
might provide is thought desirable, it may be brought in separately, 
as through amicus briefs in the courts. 
Despite the objec.tions made above, a case can be made for the 
use of advisory panels in some settings--chiefly the context of a 
small unit, such as a city or a university, in which the policymakers 
may have too many other commitments to be able to devote enough 
time to achieving a mastery of the kind of information that a small 
science court could provide. City council members, for example, are 
often unpaid, part-time politicians with a livelihood to pursue. In 
such cases, the objections stated above may be overborne by simple 
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need, though even here, if the issue is important enough (such as 
the issue in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of whether and how to regu-
late recombinant DNA research at Harvard University), the excuse 
of lack of time becomes less convincing. · Certainly if the decision 
in question is at a national level and is of a magnitude similar to some 
issues discussed earlier (banning freon production, deciding priori-
ties for the funding of energy research, etc.), the objections to the 
advisory-panel approach stated above are not countered by similar 
considerations. 
JV. SPECIFICS OF THE SCIENCE COURT PROPOSAL 
A. Who Would Use a Science Court? 
The best case for a science court can be made when it is invoked 
by Congress or the Executive for assistance in the determination of 
global policy issues. The science court proposals, if viewed as sets 
of procedures rather than as an institution, might very well assist vari-
ous administrative agencies in finding methods to resolve issues 
within their administrative jurisdiction. However, although its sig-
nificance as a set of procedures is noteworthy, greater attention here 
will be paid to an institutionalized science court that could serve 
· presidential and congressional needs. 
It should be noted that the Executive is less likely to make use 
of a science court than are administrative agencies or the Congress, 
since the President already has a science adviser and will often have 
a political stake in a decision of a science court that could be under-
mined if the decision were adverse to the Executive's interest. Con-
gress, on the other hand, is not monolithic, and if, as proposed 
below, minorities in Congress are allowed to present issues to the 
science court, political factors are likely to encourage rather than dis-
courage submission of such issues from Congress. Also suggested 
below is a system of intervention by Congress when issues are 
submitted by the President, and vice versa, based on the notion that 
once Congress has submitted an issue, allowing intervention would 
minimize the danger that either the President or Congress could 
manipulate results by presenting a set of one-sided questions to a 
science court. 
B. Who Will Select the Issues? 
One of the original purposes of the science court proposal is to 
separate the scientific questions from the policy or political issues in 
problems involving science. Consistent with that goal it ought to be 
1070 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75: 1058 
reasonably clear that the selection of the issues that a science court 
would consider is itself a political function. If Congress does not 
want to know what the effects of the SST may be on the upper at-
mosphere, there is little need for advice on the subject from a 
science court. The selection of the such issues must come from 
the body that needs to know their answer:s. This may severely limit 
the utility of the science court. If a public issue touching on a scien-
tific question involves attacks on some established practice, such as 
the production of freon, there may be little incentive for the "estab-
lishment" and its friends in Congress to invoke the assistance of a 
science court, for that interest could only lose. Other issues, such 
as which energy source should receive research funding, may not 
involve questions in which one side or another is the "established" 
interest. 
The existence of a possible institutional bias against submission 
of a particular issue to a science court does not, of course, eliminate 
the utility of the court. First, as noted above, many public questions 
will not involve entrenched positions which can only lose by answers 
to scientific questions. Second, although there may be institutional 
resistance to submission of questions in certain cases, the resistance 
is by no means insured of success. On important issues there will 
be pressure to get answers to the underlying scientific questions and 
there may be embarrassment to those resisting such a course. It is, of 
course, obvious that it would take a majority of close-minded policy-
makers on the "establishment" side of the issue, standing against the 
votes of those with fixed opinions on the opposite side plus the votes 
of those with open minds, simply to defeat the submission of an issue. 
A device for submitting issues that might preserve some of the 
benefits of a science court when Congress is the policymaker would 
be to allow a minority of defined size (such as one-third) to submit 
an issue. The size of the minority should be large enough to make 
it likely that significant interest exists in ~swers to the questions sub-
mitted. If there remain issues that should be submitted to a science 
court but for political reasons are not, it does not follow that the 
science court idea has failed. On these issues that are not submitted, 
we will have to "muddle through" with our current procedures, but 
at least we will not have fallen behind our present position. 
A problem similar to that of choosing the general issues for con-
sideration by the science court will be insuring that issues are not 
submitted in such a way as to distort the court's contribution. To 
take an extreme example, if the issue of the safety of nuclear re-
actors between now and the year 2000 were submitted to a science 
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court without submission of the issue of the safety of alternative 
energy sources, a distorted picture could emerge, even though the 
scientific questions were answered quite accurately. The stamp of 
a science court, intended to isolate scientific issues to allow for in-
formed and democratic policymaking, might have the opposite re-
sult. Unlike the problem discussed above of congressional ma-
jorities blocking issue submission, the harm from such issue distortion 
could be affirmative-not merely having the effect of preserving the 
status quo. 
Fortunately, however, the solution to the two problems is the 
same: allow congressional minorities to submit questions that round 
out the issues submitted by the majority or by other minorities. A 
congressional technical staff, such as the Office of Technological 
Assessment, could assist in the specific framing of the issues involved 
for greater protection against issue distortion. 
Unfortunately, no similar, obvious device exists when the entity 
referring issues to the science court is the executive branch of the 
government. There might be a great temptation on the part of a 
particular administration to "load the dice" by submitting carefully 
tailored issues--designed carefully enough so that the one-sidedness 
would not be blatant but might affect the political impact. The 
structure of the Executive is such that minority views within it are 
not likely to surface the way they do in Congress, and thus no inter-
nal, general "watchdog" exists to check any bias of the administra-
tion. 
Here a strong argument emerges for an institutionalized, rather 
than ad hoc, science court, since a single institution available to 
Congress and the executive could allow intervention (borrowing 
further from the courts) by congressional minorities ( or a congres-
sional majority) when it is felt that the Executive has submitted 
distorted issues. Such a course would be difficult if the President 
were free to convene his or her own science court panel not made 
available to Congress. And, of course, it would be especially 
troublesome to have two ( or more) science courts considering factual 
questions involved in the same overall issue, especially if they 
were to produce inconsistent results or at least were to give inconsist-
ent impressions by answering somewhat different but related ques-
tions. Similarly, the Executive should be able to intervene when 
issues are submitted by Congress. 
Intervention might also be allowed when an administrative 
agency makes use of a science court to determine some factual 
matters related to a policy issue. Almost inevitably there will be 
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interested parties ready to suggest supplemental questions designed 
to avoid issue distortion. At some point, however, as one moves 
down the scale from the "big issues" like energy policy to the small 
issues, the danger arises that the cost of intervention may be too 
great: questions of marginal significance to a policy issue may be 
too expensive to pursue. Here, however, the commitment of some 
small amount of policymaking function to a science court might be 
useful: the judges, given a priori time and budget restraints, could 
probably safely be counted on to make rational decisions as to how 
relevant and important for avoiding issue distortion are the issues sub-
mitted by intervention. 
C. Funding for Science Courts 
As pointed out by the Task Force of the Presidential Advisory 
Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, 14 ap-
pointed to appraise the science court proposal, there may be some 
danger that a science court used and funded by an administrative 
agency would feel pressure to produce "acceptable" results.10 Thus, 
some form of independent funding may be desirable. The Task 
Force's Interim Report, dealing only with initial experiments, has 
suggested funding from the National Science Foundation to avoid the 
problem. Since the NSF is an unlikely source of permanent funding, 
another monetary resource must be found. For a science court serv-
ing Congress and the Executive, ordinary congressional funding 
ought to be sufficient. For science courts serving the administrative 
agencies, a separate budget item and a separate budgeting advocate 
is probably advisable. 
The more troublesome side of the issue is the funding of the 
advocates. It is simply a fact of life that much more money will usu-
ally be available to one side than another if the dispute pits an en-
vironmental group against an industry, antiwar advocates against 
armament industries, and the like. The Task Force's Interim Report 
is somewhat unclear on whether or not there should be public fund-
ing of the advocates (as opposed to the court, which clearly merits 
such funding). At present the advocates probably should not be 
publicly funded. Inequality of funding has traditionally existed in 
the lobbying efforts on various public questions without much at-
tempt at adjustment by public funding. True, the stakes may be 
14. See The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 ScJBNCB 653 
(1976) (hereinafter cited as Interim Report). 
15. Id. at 654. 
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higher here, but presentations before a science court would allow 
a concentration of economic effort and much free publicity to the 
more poorly funded advocate. Thus, some of the financial inequali-
ties may actually be neutralized. Since "big" issues are likely to at-
tract at least some funding, the problem is unlikely to be acute. 
What is needed is reflection on this issue after some experience with 
the use of a science court. Insights might be gained from making 
comparisons to the problems of awarding attorneys' fees in public-
interest litigation. 
"Small issue" hearings present a different problem. It may tum 
out, for example, that small-issue hearings must be funded simply 
because no group is sufficiently economically interested in the issues 
at hand to present an adequate position. That might be the case 
with drug safety hearings-there may not be any lobby economically 
powerful enough to oppose a given drug manufacturer. This prob-
lem also suggests another difficulty, to be discussed below: what to 
do if advocates can't be found for a given side. 
D. Selection of the Advocates 
In many ways, the selection of the advocates is the most difficult 
task in designing the science court--even more difficult than the se-
lection of judges, discussed below. In a law suit, plaintiffs choose 
both themselves and the defendants as parties. Intervention is a 
rather rare event. Plaintiffs become such because they think they 
have something to gain from the litigation. In all but a few cases 
(such as class actions and so-called public interest cases) plaintiffs 
represent only their own interests. Defendants are chosen by plain-
tiffs because defendants have or can do something plaintiffs want. 
(Again, in a small number of cases, for example those challenging 
the constitutionality of a law, choosing the right defendant may be 
more of a problem.) The analogy between the law courts and the 
proposed science court breaks down badly here, however, since in 
the latter, in most cases, advocates on at least one side of an issue 
would be representing interests much wider than those of a single 
person or company. How, then, can advocates be chosen so that 
they will be representative, capable, and vigorous? 
The problem can be diminished somewhat when there is a 
natural adversary in a given controversy-for example, companies 
producing or intending to produce freon would be the obvious candi-
dates to choose the advocates on one side of the freon issue. But 
what about the other side? Who should represent the atmosphere? 
The Task Force has suggested an idea that may prove workable in 
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many (but not all) contexts. Under the proposal, chief adversaries 
or "case managers" would be appointed by the science court or the 
"collaborating agency"-the agency seeking the scientific advice. 
Both selection processes may cause difficulties. If the collaborating 
agency is seen as biased, its selection of case managers may be sus-
pect. If the science court selects the case managers, it has involved 
itself closely with the adversaries. A neutral institution, such as the 
National Science Foundation, may be a preferable agency for choos-
ing case managers. Whatever the choosing agency, the selection 
would be accomplished after "requests for proposals" for case 
managers (already dubbed "RFPs") had been issued. The Task 
Force states that 
Each submitted proposal should exhibit that the bidder has the 
expertise and constituency to speak for one side of the issue and 
name its case manager. For example, a group such as the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, the Sierra Club, or Friends of the Earth might 
be a reasonable bidder to represent the antinuclear side of that issue. 
It might form an alliance with a scientific institution such as a non-
profit analysis group, with individual consultants, or both. In any 
case, the objective is to exhibit that the bidder can provide the best 
case for its side of the issue. Combinations of groups opposing 
nuclear energy would be encouraged, and the RFP would point out 
that such coalitions would be favored to receive the contract . . . . 
The scientific credentials and constituency of the proposers will 
be examined carefully by the Science Court, the collaborating agency, 
or both, and a selection will be made by processes similar to those 
used in selecting contractors for other purposes.16 
Nothing in the Task Force's proposal inherently limits it to issues in-
volving only two sides, and one can well imagine disputes-such as 
a debate over the source of energy whose development ought to be 
most heavily funded in the next twenty years-in which three or 
more sides, each with a case manager, might participate. 
The Interim Report of the Task Force leaves unanswered what 
is to be done when there is no natural adversary, such as in the case 
of drug testing. The problem is not merely one of selecting advocates, 
but rather also involves the workability of the whole factfinding con-
cept itself, since the central purpose of the proposal is to borrow the 
adversary process from the legal model on the assumption that the 
truth would emerge after an encounter between disputing parties. 
An approach that may be worth trying when natural adversaries 
are lacking is what might be called the "canonization model," mak-
ing use of a devil's advocate. Any agency, such as the FDA, whose 
16. Id. 
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task it is to make determinations about a specific product as to which 
there is no organized opposition, might seek out a competent "hired 
gun" as ·an advocate-a kind of lawyer without a client. The weak-
ness in such an approach is that there is little incentive to keep the 
devil's advocate advocating devilishly. A lazy or complacent devil's 
advocate will do little good but will help create the false appearance 
of a useful proceeding. 
In favor of the science court proposal, even when a devil's advo-
cate is necessary, it might be noted that public prosecutors bear some 
similarities to the devil's advocate. Prosecutors theoretically "win" 
either way the case comes out-but that fact has not generally 
prevented them from gaining an emotional attachment (and thus 
some adversarial zeal) to "winning" in the more common 
sense. However, since prosecutors get to choose the cases they 
pursue, it is much easier for them to believe that the defendant is 
guilty whenever prosecuted-making emotional involvement all the 
easier. A devil's advocate against the efficacy or safety of a ran-
domly chosen drug, on the other hand, would have no such ready-
made moral crutch. 
A second argument in favor of the science court approach, even 
with the devil's advocate, is that a supposedly adversarial process 
with an ineffective advocate on the "anti" side may still be more ef-
fective in finding the truth than the ordinary inquisitorial process it 
would displace. This conclusion is sufficiently doubtful, however, to 
make it clear that a science court approach will require particular 
scrutiny when the devil's advocate must be used. Fortunately, by the 
nature of things, such situations are likely to arise only on issues that 
are not important enough to have generated much public contro-
versy. For the "big" issues, the Interim Report's method of choosing 
adversaries seems reasonably likely to be successful. 
1 E. Selection of the Judges 
The Task Force's Interim Report says: 
It is currently envisioned that the Science Court with consultation 
from appropriate scientific societies and organizations will produce 
a list of prospective judges certified as unusually capable scientists 
having no obvious connections to the disputed issue. These will 
then be examined by the case managers for prejudice. After accep-
tance, a panel of judges, say, three for the first experiment, will be 
formed.17 
17. Id. 
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The Interim Report makes no mention of the idea that judges be 
drawn from an allied field so that, while they cannot be personally 
interested, they are readily educable as to the issues. At the experi-
mental stage it might be interesting to see whether biologists, for ex-
ample, couJd function well in the context of a dispute involving 
physics. Even if that proves possible, however, it would seem likely 
that time and effort could be saved by choosing judges whose train-
ing allowed readier understanding of a given set of arguments. 
Moreover, the opinions of such judges would probably command 
more respect than would those of judges with less expertise. 
A possible alternative to the selection of unbiased judges would 
be the selection of a panel containing representatives of various view-
points. Rather obviously the judges should not have taken sides on 
the issues being presented, but it might be possible to select repre-
sentatives of various general political persuasions-conservative, 
moderate, liberal, radical, and the like. Although there are obvious 
pitfalls with such an approach, it might be tempting to use it in the 
effort to achieve wide popular acceptance of science court opinions. 
In homespun terms, officials might fear that Ralph Nader would not 
accept the opinion of a panel of Edward Tellers on any issue, 
whether or not it had to do with nuclear energy. 
Although philosophical balance on the panel is desirable, it 
should not be pursued by attempting to weigh various extremes 
against each other. The virtue of the science court proposal is that 
it harnesses bias and self-interest through the use of advocates, while 
judges remain as impartial as possible in considering scientific ques-
tions. In all but a very few cases18 the political motivations of a 
science court judge could not legitimately affect the answers to scien-
tific questions. Thus, injecting political considerations would invite 
trouble. If some people are left unsatisfied by such an approach and 
the science court's opinion on a question does not achieve universal 
acceptance, so be it. It is still open to all to point out weaknesses 
in the science court's reasoning, and it is still open to the policy-
makers-the ones who are to use the science court's opinion-to 
assess its work product in light of the criticism. 
18. It is possible that a science court judge of a particular political persuasion 
could be motivated by political views to probe certain arguments more vigorously 
than would others more politically neutral, and in the process tum up faults in the 
analysis that even the politically neutral would agree were weaknesses. The inci-
dence of such a happening should be minimized by the use of adequate advocates, 
however, since the science court judge described above would really be performing 
the function of an advocate. 
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"Balancing" may be wise in another sense: having a mixture of 
disciplines represented among the judges. The freon issue, for ex-
ample, involves problems of chemistry, meteorology, and medicine. 
In some cases in which the scientific controversies can be adequately 
separated, different panels might consider different sub-issues in-
volved in one major issue. 
It seems unlikely that there would be any particular difficulty in 
following the Interim Report's general procedure for selection of 
judges. Initially there will probably be enough interest in the idea 
to lead capable people to the job, and eventually enough prestige will 
attach to these positions to assure widespread willingness to serve. 
It is also unlikely that parties will veto prospective judges in order 
to obstruct the truth-seeking process; since public relations will be 
involved, neither side will wish to appear the obstructionist. 
The size of the panel may be an interesting subject for experi-
mentation. In particular, some hypotheses may be made, after using 
panels of three and five, as to how important the size of the panel 
is for understanding the issues, agreeing on how to resolve them, 
and producing reasonably speedy results. Panel size may also affect 
the legitimacy of the panel's opinion, with a greater number of judges 
producing greater acceptance of the decision. 
The Interim Report made a distinction between the judges of 
a science court and what it referred to as a "referee." The exact 
nature of the referee's function is not detailed: "In addition to the 
panel of judges, there should be a referee, selected by the Science 
Court, who is concerned with the implementation of agreed proce-
dures in a scientific setting. For discussion we propose that the 
referee should be a scientist advised by legal counsel, so that full 
responsibility for this procedure can be retained by the scientific 
community."10 It appears that the referee would fulfill the role of 
the judge in making procedural rulings, but the nature of the proce-
dural disputes the referee would settle is not specified. The Interim 
Report also indicates that the referee might be one of the judges 
-a chief judge. 
It is not clear that the function of ruling on procedural matters 
would have to be separated from the judges' factfinding function, 
or that it would have to be concentrated in one person. In other 
words, there is no obvious reason for preventing all of the judges 
from considering procedural matters, just as they all will consider 
sut;,stantive matters. The Interim Report's suggestion that a lawyer 
19. Interim Report, supra note 14, at 654. 
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be made available for advice on procedural matters is probably a 
good one, and the suggestion that referees (if they are not judges 
or chief judges) not be lawyers is undoubtedly wise. Lawyers have 
a certain amount of expertise in factfinding procedures, but that ex-
pertise deals with a procedure only somewhat analogous to that of 
the science court, and there is consequently no compelling reason 
to take control of the proceedings away from the scientist-judges. 
F. The Proceedings 
1. Formalizing the Issues 
For a number of reasons, the issues submitted to a science court 
must be policy issues. It is not reasonable to assume, for example, 
that policymakers will necessarily be able to identify 411 of the rele-
vant scientific questions. Thus, the issues submitted to the science 
court must be reduced to questions of scientific fact. 
One of the chief criticisms that has been leveled at the science 
court proposal is that it is not always possible to separate issues of 
scientific fact from issues of policy. AB yet, however, it does not 
appear that the adherents of such a claim have produced either a 
particular instance of inseparable questions or some pervasive rea-
soning that indicates that such questions exist. The most persuasive 
argument here may be by analogy to the mixed questions of fact and 
law that arise in the legal system-for example, a jury issue of 
whether a particular civil defendant's conduct was negligent. But 
even the negligence question involves physical facts that are dis-
tinguishable from the assessment of whether or not the facts consti-
tute negligence. Apart from such analogies, there seems little reason 
to believe that factual issues cannot be distilled from a debate over 
public policy.20 
The Task Force's Interim Report contemplates that the process 
of reducing issues to questions of fact will begin with each side mak-
ing an allegation of facts free from value judgments-specific-
ally, "they must be results or anticipated results of experiments 
20. See, e.g., a letter to ScIENCE from Leon Lipson of the Yale Law School, in 
which the author notes that the success of a science court "rests upon a distinction-
rendered no more persuasive by frequent repetition-between facts and values." 194 
ScIENCE 890 (1976). As noted in the text, however, so far no one seems to have 
produced issues in which facts and values are inseparable. This matter appears to 
be one of those issues in which the burden of proof should be placed on those assert-
ing that a problem exists, rather than on those suggesting the opposite, since the for• 
mer have to produce only one example to make their point, while the latter would 
have to review an infinite number of possibilities to prove their assertion. 
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or observations of nature."21 This requirement does not insure, 
however, that the statements will be provable or disprovable in 
any absolute sense. For example, a statement would satisfy this 
criterion if it asserted that the probability is one in one billion that 
cancerous tumors will develop in humans who ingest a fixed amount 
of a certain substance. But how would one conclusively prove such 
a statement? This requirement at least does assure that nonfactual 
questions, such as the acceptability of a certain risk, will not be in-
jected into the scientific issues. 
After a party submits its list of assertions and they have been 
examined by the court to determine whether they contain only 
assertions of fact, they will be accepted or challenged by the 
opposition. Thus, in the manner of requests for admissions, this pro-
cedure will determine the questions in dispute. One innovation here 
is the Interim Report's suggestion that there be "mediation" by 
unspecified persons to determine whether disagreements on various 
issues could be eliminated. 
2. Discovery 
The Interim Report discusses but takes no stand on the sensitive 
issue of discovery. This problem, while admittedly vexing in the 
legal system, is made even more difficult in the context of a science 
court by the dilemma of choosing appropriate sanctions for noncom-
pliance. In the legal system, a wide range of sanctions is generally 
available, graduating from minor sanctions to extreme measures such 
as treating individual issues, or even the merits of the case, as settled 
against the recalcitrant party. 22 Such sanctions would rather clearly 
be inappropriate for a science court. For example, the United States 
should not be committed to a specific energy policy because of one 
party's misconduct, rather than as a consequence of an assessment 
of the facts. The legal system can afford such results because the 
disputes it handles are between litigants who must bear responsibility 
for their acts. No such principle controls where the advocates repre-
sent positions affecting us all. 
On the whole, discovery seems to promise more trouble than it 
would be worth. Since the nature of the facts to be determined by 
a science court is scientific, and therefore general rather than specific 
(e.g., did defendant go through a red light on a specific occasion?), 
the need for discovery diminishes. Some discoverable items might 
21. Id. 
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). 
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be valuable, such as the results of specific tests that are expensive 
to conduct (and thus costly for the other side to repeat) or are 
time consuming ( and thus not possible to repeat within the time con-
straints of a science court). But the likelihood is slight that test re-
sults known to be in existence will be withheld, since, with or without 
specific sanctions, most parties will recognize that such nondisclosure 
will probably lead to results unfavorable to them. 
The real problem in designing discovery procedures for a science 
court is how to deal with tests conducted by one side that do not 
become known to the other. Even in such cases, however, the po-
tential for harm resulting from not permitting discovery can be re-
duced. An ethic among individual scientists allowing for the produc-
tion of such information without sanctions can be established. Since 
it is generally unlikely to have expensive or time-consuming tests that 
involve only a small number of people, the probability that the mate-
rial would be divulged by at least one person would be high. 
The costs of allowing discovery seem to outweigh the ill effects 
of not permitting it, even though it must be recognized that an ethic 
of disclosure will not eliminate the possibility of concealment of im-
portant facts. With the unavailability of sanctions going to the 
merits, 23 the search for effective sanctions is difficult. And battles 
over discovery might divert the attention of the litigants and the court 
away from the central issues. Moreover, the prestige, and thus 
utility, of the science court could be diminished greatly if a proceed-
ing were to degenerate into what might be viewed as legal wrangling. 
Until evidence appears to the contrary, it seems safe to assume that 
the political dangers of being discovered withholding important in-
formation are adequate incentives to be sufficiently honest. 24 
One type of discovery-that which is designed to uncover early 
information about evidence that an opponent intends to produce-
is clearly easier to deal with than discovery aimed at material that 
an opponent might be trying to conceal. There will be much less 
resistance to discovery of evidence to be presented, and sanctions, 
such as delaying the proceedings in order to allow the side refused 
discovery to digest new evidence that should have been produced 
by discovery, would probably prove effective without seriously inter-
23. See text at note 22 supra. 
24: Discovery might prove to be practical for "small-issue hearings" in a science 
court. FDA drug proceedings are an obvious example. The difference between such 
proceedings and the "big proceedings" discussed in the text lies in the degree to which 
one side or the other is already regulated and subject to discovery by alternative 
methods. 
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fering with the accuracy of the conclusions reached by the science 
court. 
Rejecting discovery, of course, does not imply that the science 
court should reject all traditional legal controls on accuracy. In par-
ticular, it might be wise to retain the sanction of perjury for deliber-
ate misstatements of fact. 
3. Presentation of Evidence 
The Interim Report notes that traditional legal rules of evidence 
would not be controlling before the science court. A specific 
example is the need to qualify an expert witness, "since his state-
ments will be open to detailed challenge. "25 Other requirements, 
like relevance, would ·be retained. "Traditional" scientific rules of 
evidence would be followed without prior specification since, as the 
Task Force indicates, they have not been written down anywhere 
in coherent form. Presumably these rules include such matters as 
proper statistical inference, reliance on double-blind tests in cases 
of medication, and the like. 
An interesting question here is whether evidence should be 
presented in written or oral form. The Task Force notes advantages 
on both sides.26 The avoidance of dramatic surprise (eliminated in 
part in the legal system by discovery) and of wrangling over evidenti-
ary matters, and the tradition of the scientific community in relying 
on written communication, favor the use of written evidence. 
Factors favoring the use of oral evidence are speed in presentation 
and the increased credibility resulting from greater opportunity for 
public scrutiny of the science court's proceedings. 
This area is one in which procedural flexibility should be re-
tained. Presentation of complex matters, including calculations, may 
be virtually useless if given in purely oral form. On the other hand, 
cross-examination and focusing on particular points are greatly facili-
tated by oral presentations. It is doubtful that precise evidentiary 
rules can be designed beforehand, or that the proper mix of such 
rules for one hearing would be the proper mix for another. This 
area seems appropriate for ad hoc agreements among the adversaries 
and the court, with the court ruling in the case of continuing dispute. 
4. The Opinion of the Science Court 
The most crucial stage of the proceedings may be the opinion 
25. Interim Report, supra note 14, at 655. 
26. Id. 
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of the science court. It is here that the most safeguards can be taken 
against the legitimate doubts and fears of those who oppose or are 
not convinced of the virtues of a science court. The Interim Report 
shows a good degree of sensitivity to these concerns in its very brief 
discussion of this issue. It indicates that the opinion should consist 
primarily of two series of factual statements: the first, those agreed 
on by the adversaries, and the second, those determined by the 
science court. The statements of fact, of course, can be cumulative 
-that is, statement 10 may indicate that if statements 4 and 5 
are true, then something else is also true. 
Critical to the integrity of the process is the Interim Report's sug-
gestion that "some or most of these statements of fact will be quali-
fied with statements about probable validity or margins of error."27 
Thus, the Interim Report points out, ignorance as well as knowledge 
will be delineated. A beneficial side effect of indicating areas of 
ignorance will be the indication of where new research might be ap-
propriate. And, as the Interim Report emphasizes, the opinion must 
not contain any statements of policy-only of fact. 
The Interim Report fails to deal with several questions involving 
the opinion of the science court, however. One possibly useful pro-
cedure would be to impose a format for the opinion requiring the 
recitation, in substance, of the tentative nature of all conclusions on 
scientific issues that would emphasize that the opinion deals only 
with probabilities. Such a recitation should be at the head of the 
opinion and should not be in standardized form. In fact, by avoiding 
standardization (but, one hopes, retaining brevity), the rhetorical 
tendencies of the opinion writer might be satisfied, which might help 
keep the recitation from becoming a piece of boilerplate ignored by 
the press and other observers. The function of the recitation, of 
course, is to serve as a constant reminder that the science court is 
not the Supreme Court of Science, 28 making final determinations of 
truth. Any opportunity to make that point, and thus lessen the cur-
rency of that belief, should be used. 
Another point not raised by the Interim Report, but which was 
suggested by its reference to spotlighting areas needing additional 
research, is whether the court should ask the adversaries to perform 
specific experiments or studies before the final opinion is rendered. 
Obviously such requests should be made with discretion, since they 
create a significant danger of excessive cost and delay. But some 
27. Id. 
28. This phrase is attributed to Alan McGowan, President of the Scientists' In-
stitute for Public Information, in Boffey, supra note 1. 
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issues might be resolved, for example, by further analysis of existing 
data. Thus, even after the ordinary presentation of evidence has 
ended and judicial deliberations have begun, some dialogue between 
the science court and the adversaries may be advisable, similar to 
a law court's request that counsel brief an issue. 
A third point that is not dealt with by the Interim Report is 
dissenting opinions in the science court. It is almost inevitable that 
they will be allowed, since the legitimacy of an opinion could not 
long be artificially sustained in the face of reports of dissension 
within the court. On' the other hand, the destructive effect of dis-
senting opinions might be substantially reduced (as might the 
tendency to dissent in the first place) if certain procedural require-
ments are imposed. Dissenters could be required to name specific 
statements in the findings of the majority with which they disagree 
and to state explicitly what the grounds for disagreement are. 
Second, the majority could be required to answer the dissent point 
by point. It is hard to believe that any dissents would survive this 
requirement (the majority having capitulated or the potential dis-
senter having had a change of mind) unless the disagreement is one 
that expresses an underlying uncertainty-which the majority 
opinion itself ought to proclaim. In any event, the requirements of 
direct response to contrary assertions (which is much like the adver-
sarial duty imposed on the parties) would be educational, and 
readers of science court opinions would be spared the frustration that 
lawyers suffer when the majority and dissenting opinions of law 
courts are unresponsive to each other. 
A final matter of great importance treated only sketchily by the 
Interim Report is the finality to be granted to the science court's 
opinion. It is tempting to say that there should be no such finality-
that science marches on. But the context in which the opinion is 
sought-the need to make policy decisions-means that some 
degree of finality must exist. Also, limitations on time and money 
dictate that not every new datum lead to reinspection of a well-
considered opinion. 
Two mechanisms ought to be available for reconsideration of a 
science court opinion. First, reconsideration should be allowed if 
sought by the governmental instrumentality that originally requested 
the science court's opinion. If, after a year of further research, Con-
gress wants a second opinion on the safety of nuclear reactors, why 
not provide it? In some cases the requesting agency might wish to 
have the decision reviewed on a periodic basis. Second, there 
should be some opportunity for the adversaries to initiate calls for 
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reconsideration in light of new data. Practicality should be the key 
here-not the intricacies of such rules as rule 60(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Considerations of whether or not to re-
open an issue in response to an adversary's request ought to be as 
follows: 
(1) are the new data significant enough to make the expense 
of reconsideration worthwhile? 
(2) has the policy decision already been made on the basis of 
the original opinion, and, if so, is it practical to change it if the opin-
ion of the court should change? 
(3) is the overall issue important enough, even assuming that 
no irrevocable commitments have been made and that the science 
court's opinion might be changed, to undergo the costs of reconsid-
eration? 
Obviously there are policy and scientific questions present in 
these considerations, and one of the goals of promoters of the science 
court idea has been the avoidance of policy determinations by a 
science court. An approach reasonably accommodating all interests 
might be to allow the parties to move reconsideration to the court 
by submitting a concise statement of reasons for it. The court could 
then make some preliminary estimate-a guess, really-as to the 
probability that its original opinion would be affected by the new 
data. If that probability seemed small enough, the matter could stop 
there, with the science court rejecting the request. If the probability 
seemed great enough, the science court could formally propose to 
go ahead with a reinquiry. Such reconsideration could proceed sub-
ject to a veto power of the agency that originally requested the 
opinion, but once more the rules could be adjusted to make a veto 
as difficult to use as necessary, so that politics could not squelch a 
truly likely change of result, while potential changes of position by 
the science court that have been rendered irrelevant by external 
events (such as commitment of funds, or abandonment of a project 
for other than scientific reasons) need not be pursued. 
V. THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF A SCIENCE COURT 
The most pointed opposition to the science court proposal has 
come from those who think not that it will be ineffective, but rather 
that it will be too effective in making its judgments on scientific 
matters conclusive. One critic has dubbed the proposed science 
court "the Supreme Court of Science."29 In support of such fears, 
29. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
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critics have reminded us of the medieval Church's censorship of 
Galileo or of Lysenko's more recent death-grip on Soviet research in 
the biological sciences. In their more extreme forms, these fears 
seem quite clearly unfounded. The purposes of the proposed 
science court is not to settle scientific truth, but rather to give provi-
sional answers to questions that, for some purposes, need immediate 
answers. As indicated earlier, it would seem to be a good idea to 
begin each opinion with a paragraph reminding the reader of 
the purpose served by the court. But beyond that point, special 
efforts to avoid dogmatism seem superfluous-the pace of scientific 
discovery in recent years has given both scientists and the public a 
healthy skepticism for "final" answers to scientific questions. 
A more realistic fear is that public funding of research in par-
ticular scientific areas may be curtailed by determinations of a 
science court on those matters. If a science court tells Congress, 
for example, that hydrogen fusion is unlikely to provide significant 
percentages of U.S. power needs before the year 2000, Congress 
may well curtail funds for fusion research. But informed policy-
making, including budget decisions, is precisely the reason for the 
proposed science court. Just as there is no infringement of the first 
amendment when the Postal Service requires magazine publishers to 
pay postage, there is no impermissible infringement of free scientific 
inquiry when Congress uses practicality as a guide for terminating 
funding of certain inquiries-no matter how disappointed those de-
prived of such funds may be. 
Once this principle is accepted, the relevant question is this: does 
the proposed science court somehow pose new or previously unim-
portant problems regarding the exercise of the pursemaster's discre-
tion whether to fund scientific research? To the extent that the 
science court assists in more rational decisionmaking, it clearly does 
not pose any such problems. To the extent that a particular science 
court opinion may live too long, however, it clearly does. In other 
words, if a particular science court opinion becomes sanctified, it may 
stifle funding long after new discoveries make its conclusions doubt-
ful. The procedures for reconsideration discussed above, however, 
should effectively minimize such dangers. 
Reflection on these affirmative dangers of a science court leads 
to the conclusion that they can be eliminated or effectively mini-
mized. There remains, however, the difficult question whether a 
science court might prove to be merely ineffective, and thus not 
worthy of establishment even if the affirmative dangers can be safely 
dealt with. The next section follows, in an abbreviated fashion, 
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an imaginary case through a science court in order to set a basis 
for consideration of this last and most difficult question. 
VI. A "CASE HISTORY" OF A MATTER BEFORE 
THE SCIENCE COURT 
In order to make much of the discussion above more concrete, 
what follows is an imagined history of a case submitted by Congress 
to a s_cience court. I have chosen a question of current interest but 
have embellished freely on the political situation in order to illustrate 
various aspects of the operations of a science court. 
Imagine that Congress is contemplating the modification of the 
Delaney Amendment30 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.31 The Delaney Amendment was added to section 348(c) 
(3)(A) of the Act, which allows only "safe" food additives to be 
used, and provides: "[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if 
it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if 
it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of 
the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal. 
.... " The proposed modification would allow the continued sale 
of saccharin, which we will assume has been banned by the FDA. 
Under the proposals made above, Congress proposes a question 
to the science court. The question is in very general form and con-
tains a policy component: "Should the sale of saccharin be allowed 
as it had been until mid-1977?" The President, concerned with the 
vitality of the large saccharin industry and fearing that the answers 
of the science court might discourage the relegalization of the 
substance, intervenes to pose the further question, "If not, should 
saccharin be made available on a more restrictive basis?" (Recall 
that political backdrop is being fabricated to illustrate the use of the 
science court proposal.) 
Under established procedures, the matter is publicized, and 
individuals and groups are invited to propose themselves as advo-
cates for the competing sides. The National Science Foundation is 
chosen to select the advocates. On the one side, the saccharin pro-
ducers band together with an impressive team of scientists and 
lawyers to present a united front. The American Medical Associa-
tion and other groups, however, suggest that saccharin be made 
available only to diabetics and to those certified by a doctor to be 
overweight and in need of a sugar substitute. Ralph Nader and 
numerous other public-interest lobbyists submit bids to represent the 
side advocating a complete ban on saccharin. 
30. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970). 
31. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-392 (1970). 
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Faced with these bids, the National Science Foundation 
establishes three sides: pro-saccharin, limited saccharin, and anti-
saccharin. It selects the industry group to advocate for the first posi-
tion ( the only candidate) and negotiates with the AMA and the other 
limited-saccharin groups until they agree on a single advocate team. 
No such agreement proves possible among the anti-saccharin groups, 
and the National Science Foundation chooses the one it believes to 
be best able to represent the anti-saccharin position. Several of the 
groups complain about politics and imply that the NSF has deliber-
ately chosen a group that will not present the most effective possible 
case. Some of them later take advantage of the opportunity to 
submit amicus briefs on various matters. 
When the advocates have been selected, the NSF compiles a 
large list of scientists who have worked in the area of human nutri-
tion (and perhaps some who have done cancer research), none of 
whom has any contact with the saccharin issue itself. The names 
of everyone known to have taken strong public stands on closely re-
lated issues are deleted from the list. The anti-saccharin group com-
plains that the process of eliminating the names of potential judges 
who have taken public stands on related issues has automatically pro-
duced a bias toward conservatism and traditionalism on the panel, 
but the NSF refuses to change the list, and a panel of three is se-
lected by lot after a few names have been challenged successfully 
for potential prejudice. One of the groups that sought to be advo-
cate for the anti-saccharin position announces publicly that, because 
of built-in bias against the choice of radical scientists as judges, the 
panel is biased and consequently the group will consider the results 
invalid. 
The first task for the advocates is to propose a series of asser-
tions, in the form of factual statements, for submission to the science 
court. The pro-saccharin advocate submits (among many others) 
the statements that "no deaths or cases of cancer in humans have been 
reliably attributed to saccharin ingestion," "the consumption of sugar 
dropped only three per cent despite the recent rapid price increase 
of over 200 per cent" (suggesting great need or desire for sweet-
eners), and "in experiments with rats, animals allowed equal access 
to sweeteners and to food die of malnutrition" (suggesting that mere 
willpower is not enough to do without sweeteners). The limited-sac-
charin group submits similar statements but emphasizes that certain 
groups, such as diabetics, have no adequate substitute for saccharin, 
and that obesity is believed to cause far more deaths annually than 
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does cancer possibly resulting from saccharin ingestion. The anti-
saccharin group submits the original test results (and other subse-
quent tests) showing the causal connection between saccharin and 
bladder tumors in mice; this group also submits statements of the 
form "X number of people are likely to die of cancer each year if 
saccharin continues to be sold." 
The science court reviews the submitted statements; a few are 
found to contain impermissible nonfactual elements and are rejected 
as to form by the court. The parties revise those questions to con-
fine them to factual assertions and then resubmit them. Many state-
ments are agreed to by all the parties, and they are automatically 
incorporated into the findings of the science court. The rest become 
the subject of hearings. 
By agreement among the parties, each side informs the others 
in advance of the witnesses it intends to call and identifies the studies 
upon which -it will rely. A summary of the witnesses' proposed testi-
mony is exchanged before the day of testimony to allow adverse par-
ties to prepare better for cross-examination. Some testimony is 
accepted in written form, and some witnesses testify both orally and 
in writing, with the latter concentrating on technical matters, especi-
ally calculations. 
At the end of the testimony and submission of documents, the 
science court panel begins its deliberations. It calls on the parties 
a few times to ask further questions. The process of decision takes 
two months, and a rather lengthy opinion is produced. It contains 
a summary of the court's holding and findings on the specific state-
ments submitted by the parties. Some statements are labeled as true 
or false with a high degree of certainty; some are found to be irrele-
vant to the questions presented to the court; some are found to be 
true or false with a limited degree of certainty. For example, the 
court finds that a substance shown to produce cancer in mice is very 
likely but not certain to produce cancer in humans. Consistent with 
its mission to address only factual questions, the court does not an-
swer the question whether the Delaney Amendment ought to be re-
pealed or modified to allow the sale of saccharin. 
With the answers from the science court, the debate in Congress 
does not disappear. The answers provided by the science court have 
indicated both that there is substantial risk of cancer associated with 
the use of large amounts of saccharin and that it is probable that 
large numbers of people will significantly increase sugar consumption 
if saccharin becomes unavailable, probably leading to increased inci-
dence of heart attacks and other health problems associated with 
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overweight. But these findings do nothing to indicate whether Con-
gress ought to take into account the potential for self-control-which 
can reduce the risks associated with sugar if intake is limited but not 
those associated with saccharin if it is used as a sugar substitute and 
its intake is not limited. Nor has the opinion of the science court 
offered any counsel on whether a given number of deaths due to 
cancer may be worse for society than the same number of deaths 
due to heart attacks, given the greater fear that cancer generates in 
the public. These and other questions remain policy issues for Con-
gress to resolve. Some are dissatisfied that submission of the issue 
to the science court has not resolved all of these questions. 
VII. Is IT WORTH IT? 
Unfortunately, judging the success or failure of a science court 
may be no easy matter. Even the simple question of whether or 
not a science court's answers to scientific questions are accurate will 
be elusive. Assume, for example, in the saccharin case history of 
the previous section, Congress had decided, after considering the 
science court's opinion, to modify the Delaney Amendment in such 
a way as to make saccharin as freely available as it traditionally has 
been. It might be possible in the future to make guesses as to how 
many cancer deaths (or sicknesses) had occurred as a result of this 
decision, but it would not be possible to verify the science court's 
answers to questions concerning how many deaths and disabilities 
would have occurred due to increased sugar consumption if the ban 
on saccharin had not been lifted. In other words, sometimes the 
very conclusions of a science court will make verification of some 
of its answers impossible. 
A more subtle point in judging the work of a science court is 
the fact that an erroneous conclusion of scientific fact by the court 
does not necessarily mean failure of the concept of a science court. 
A science court predicting future, unknown developments will ob-
viously be wrong upon occasion. The real concern, however, should 
be its overall record, not its predictions on individual points. After 
all, the only way that one can give foolproof answers to all questions 
concerning the results of future research is actually to do the re-
search. If the question involves the results of research that would 
consume the next twenty years, a perfectly accurate answer would 
require twenty years of research, as well as all the money Congress 
does not want to spend without some indication that it will be well 
spent. Once more, however, a science court's ability to modify its 
opinions when subsequent developments call for it should be a factor 
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in evaluating the success of the court, even if initial absolute accuracy 
is not required. 
These concerns, however, are merely problems with the accuracy 
of the answers to be supplied by a science court. The more complex 
problem is their utility. Some policymakers, for example, do not 
want merely factual information from the court, especially if that in-
formation is presented in the form of probabilities rather than cer-
tainties. Senator Muskie is said to have yearned for a "one-armed 
scientist" who would not follow each assertion with the statement, 
"[O]n the other hand .... "32 Similarly, there are policymakers 
who undoubtedly want policy recommendations from their scientist-
advisers. Despite the understandability of such desires, however, it 
is precisely the function of our policymakers to make policy and to 
deal with the real world realistically-which includes dealing with 
uncertainties. Indeed, dealing with uncertainties that cannot be 
further resolved is necessarily a policy function rather than the func-
tion of a factfinder. If the effect of a science court is to force policy-
makers to perform their proper roles, even when the task is not easy, 
it will have had some success. 33 
The question remains, however, whether the efforts needed to 
create and use a science court are justified by the potential benefits 
of the institution. Ironically, there is no scientific test for whether 
a science court is successful, since the question is social rather than 
scientific. Apart from a record of inaccurate opinions that would in-
dicate failure, the science court idea would also be a failure if the ac-
curacy of its opinions were high but they were left unused or were 
misused. As a realistic matter, deciding whether or not an opinion 
has been misused will not often be immediately possible. In the short 
run, judging the success of a science court, like most political assess-
ments, will have to rely mostly on intuitive judgments. By way of 
32. The remark is reported in Hammond & Adelman, Science, Values, and Hu-
man Judgment, 194 ScIENCE 389, 390 (1976). 
33. It can well be argued that there is some utility in concealing policy decisions 
behind nonpolicy rationales, such as disputes over facts. For example, it is rea-
sonably possible to calculate how many lives will be lost in the process of construct-
ing a given bridge. If undue emphasis were placed on this loss of life (ignoring at-
tempts to minimize risk, voluntary assumption of risk, benefits of the project, and 
the like), perhaps no bridges would be built. Assuming that there are any cases 
in which such concealment would be acceptable, they should obviously be few in 
number in an intelligent society in which policymakers are to be held responsible 
to the electorate. There seems no reason to believe that social problems involving 
scientific or technological questions are more likely than others to justify such con-
cealment of the truth. Thus, this objection is no stronger when applied against the 
science court idea than against any other factfinding process we have as a resource 
for policymaking. 
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analogy, the success or failure of the legal system is not based on the 
correctness of the decisions it reaches, since there is no independent 
way to judge correctness. Instead, the success of the legal system is 
measured by the confidence people have that it reaches an accept-
ably high level of correct decisions (given its costs), and that in turn 
is based on perceptions of the fairness of the proceedings, compe-
tence of the participants, and the like. 
At this point one can only guess, of course, whether a science 
court would contribute significantly to the intelligent resolution of 
science-oriented policy questions, or whether it might become "just 
another federal bureaucracy," in the words of recent political cam-
paigns. It is hard to avoid a certain amount of optimism about the 
utility of a science court that would be used in connection with 
reasonably important public issues. Even small contributions to the 
intelligent resolution of very important controversies are likely to be 
worthwhile, so long as the danger is minimized (as it can be) that 
the contribution would be negative. Thus, the likelihood is reason-
ably high that a science court would contribute more than it would 
cost. 
By similar reasoning the case for establishment of an experimen-
tal science court is almost compelling. Even if one doubts its likely 
contribution, the potential for utility is great enough to justify an ef-
fort to try the concept and assess its performance. 
